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FOREWORD
ALWAYS AT THE MARGIN:
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN FLUX
*

THE HONORABLE RANDALL R. RADER

The U.S. Courts of Appeals rarely issue binding precedential
opinions that reiterate only solid black-letter principles of law.
Instead, the regional circuits and the national Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit typically issue precedential opinions in cases
featuring facts that press at the margins of established law. These
constant and recurrent “close calls” persistently press the appellate
courts to expand or contract the reach of legal rules.
The dynamics of appellate review bias the common law system of
appeals in favor of constant evolution and alteration of the precise
bounds of the law. This phenomenon occurs for a couple of reasons.
In the first place, the district courts competently apply settled
principles of law. Skilled appellate lawyers quickly and convincingly
advocate against futile appeals. Thus, cases relying on settled
principles tend to settle before appeal. If a party insists on an appeal,
those same skilled attorneys cast even a simple case in terms that
press at questioned margins of the law.
For still another reason, most precedential cases involve the
difficult frontiers of the law. When an appeal does invoke solely
stable doctrines, appellate judges—pressed to keep pace with a
heavy workload—often resolve the matter using a truncated

* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I would like to
thank the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse for its research
and analysis with respect to inequitable conduct case trends. I also thank Joss
Nichols and Adam Eltoukhy for their assistance in preparing this Foreword.
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1

non-precedential format. Thus, for various reasons, the common law
system, with its focus on correcting legal error and accepting the facts
as found in the trial court, produces precedential opinions that press
at the margins of the law. The result is that too often precedential
opinions make new law rather than reaffirm the old (and note, even
the term “old” seems perjorative when in fact it represents stability).
With such concentration at the margins, the boundaries of the law
undergo constant evolution—to use a flattering modifier—
or constant destabilization—to take a more pessimistic tact.
If it were otherwise—that is, if settled issues were truly settled—one
would expect to see fewer appeals relating to longstanding doctrines
over time. Yet, with the outer limits of the law in constant flux—
my general impression after roughly twenty years as a judge on the
Federal Circuit—the number of appeals of supposed black-letter
issues of patent law might generally increase over time. To test this
intuition in one narrow area of law, I turned to research by the
Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse (IPLC). This
reputable institution tallied the appeals involving inequitable
conduct. From 2004 to 2007, an admittedly small sample, the
number of appeals involving that issue steadily increased, even
though the total number of patent appeals to the Federal Circuit
2
remained fairly constant :

1. The Federal Circuit also has given itself the power, under Local Rule 36,
to enter a summary judgment of affirmance under certain circumstances, such as
when a judgment or decision has been entered in the district court without an error
of law. See FED. CIR. LOC. R. 36(e).
2. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Filings of Patent
Infringement Appeals from the U.S. District Courts, available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/PatentFilingsHistorical2000-2009.pdf.
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According to IPLC’s research, the number of cases appealed on
inequitable conduct rose from thirteen to thirty between 2004 and
3
2007, with a small drop in 2008 to twenty-six. This overall rising
trend in the number of inequitable conduct cases could have many
sources beyond the unsettled nature of the doctrine as the appeals
press at the margins of the law. Nonetheless, it is one indicator that
this doctrine requires repeated appeals and clarification after
clarification at the margins.
The trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases that spawned the doctrine
of inequitable conduct all involved clear-cut scenarios where a witness
was paid to suppress or falsify information without which the
applicant would not have had a chance to obtain a patent. The only

3. The IPLC reached these numbers by (1) looking for any case in PACER
(a service that offers online access to U.S. district court documents) where the
district court’s opinion or judgment (including non-final opinions/judgments)
included the words “inequitable conduct” for the inequitable conduct search and
“equivalents” or “equivalency” for the doctrine of equivalents search and (2) picking
out those cases where a notice of appeal or other Federal Circuit-related event
occurred within thirty days after the opinion or judgment was filed. This is likely an
overinclusive data set. For example, the IPLC’s search would pick up an appeal if
inequitable conduct was decided in the district court’s final opinion even if the
parties did not appeal the issue. It also might be underinclusive. For example, there
might have been cases where a summary judgment ruling dismissed an inequitable
conduct counterclaim in 2004, but the final judgment after trial was not rendered
until 2007. If the final judgment or notice of appeal did not mention inequitable
conduct, it would not be counted even if the summary judgment ruling was an issue
on appeal. Finally, only the data for 2005 and later is included because before that
many district court dockets were not accessible via PACER. Mark A. Lemley & J. H.
Walker, Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse: Data Overview (Stanford Pub. Law,
Working Paper No. 1024032), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024032.
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question in those cases was what effect the fraudulent conduct should
have on the patentee’s case.
A cursory examination of the development of inequitable conduct
law also lends support to the notion that this doctrine is constantly
overflowing its banks. As suggested earlier, the doctrine’s roots
extend to Supreme Court cases where applicants “lied, cheated, and
stole” to obtain a patent—hardly difficult matters to resolve.
4
In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., after learning about a
possible prior use, the applicant paid the purported prior user to sign
an affidavit that stated that the prior use was an abandoned
experiment, to assign any rights he might have to the applicant, and
5
to suppress evidence. The Court held that such conduct with respect
to one patent was sufficient to infect causes of action based on related
6
patents. The “deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme
7
to defraud” in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. involved a
patentee who paid an expert after he falsely told the defendants that
he, not the patentee’s attorney, wrote an article that extolled the
8
ingenuity of the invention at issue. The Court held that the court of
appeals could have set aside its earlier judgment after those facts
9
came to light.
Finally, the patentee in Precision Instrument
10
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co. was
punished because it settled an interference proceeding after the
opposing applicant admitted to lying. Rather than “doing all within
its power to reveal and expose the fraud,” however, the patentee
acquired the rights to, and attempted to assert and enforce, the
11
“perjury-tainted patents.”
The Court held that the inequitable
conduct “impregnated [the patentee’s] entire cause of action,” which
12
included claims premised on contracts and other patents.
Interestingly, the Court used broad language in these cases to
13
highlight the need for flexibility.
4. 290 U.S. 240, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 228 (1933).
5. Id. at 243, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 229.
6. Id. at 246, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 230.
7. 322 U.S. 238, 245, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 241, 245 (1944), overruled on other
grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976).
8. Id. at 240–42, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 243–44.
9. Id. at 249–50, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 246–47.
10. 324 U.S. 806, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133 (1945).
11. Id. at 816, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 138.
12. Id. at 819, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 139–40.
13. See id. at 816, 65 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 138 (“The far-reaching social and
economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest
in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate
scope.”); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 248, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 246 (“[T]his
equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to
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These cases have several common characteristics. In each case,
egregious fraud, perjury, and extortion infected every part of the
patent acquisition and enforcement process. The perpetrator of the
fraud would not have received, or been able to enforce, the patent
without the egregious conduct. In other words, without the fraud,
the patent right would not have been enforceable at all. And notably,
the Supreme Court did not make any connection between its
inequitable conduct doctrine and an incentive to disclose prior art to
the patent officer during prosecution. In other words, this doctrine
was not born as a universal principle to encourage a patent owner to
disclose (excessive amounts of) prior art, but only as a remedy for
truly abusive behavior. Indeed the United States remains the only
country in the world that embraces inequitable conduct as an
incentive to disclose prior art. If the United States establishes an
opposition system in its patent reform efforts, much of the
justification for the expanded modern inequitable conduct doctrine
will disappear.
This brief forward is not the place to document the gradual
expansion of this doctrine, which grew from a tiny bush on the patent
landscape that inhibited gross fraud into a ubiquitous weed that
infects every prosecution and litigation involving patents. That
expansion took on several forms. For instance, as mentioned, the
doctrine took on the purpose of eliciting prior art from a patent
14
applicant.

meet new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the
relief necessary to correct the particular injustices involved in these situations.”);
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245–46, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
228, 230 (1933) (“[Courts] apply the maxim [of clean hands], not by way of
punishment for extraneous transgressions, but upon considerations that make for
the advancement of right and justice. They are not bound by formula or restrained
by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of discretion.”).
14. The first case to render a patent unenforceable for a mere failure to disclose
prior art appears to have been Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d
555 (5th Cir. 1970). In the related case of In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623, 187 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 209 (C.C.P.A. 1975), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed the
Patent Office’s rejection of a reissue application for the patent at issue in Beckman.
Id. at 628, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 213. Although the court noted that the applicant’s
failure to disclose the prior art was “not fraud,” the court nonetheless held that “an
applicant or his agent cannot knowingly withhold relevant prior art from the
examiner until he finds out whether such action invalidates his patent and then
apply for reissue only if he loses the gamble.” Id., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 213;
see Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1235, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811,
1820 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Given that these material references were repeatedly before
Nilssen, and his failure to offer any good faith explanation for withholding them
other than mere oversight, we find an inference that Nilssen intended to deceive the
PTO not unreasonable.”).
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In another expansion, the doctrine grew to embrace any kind of
perfidy, no matter how inconsequential to the grant of a patent.
In other words, any misstatement or overstatement, even if irrelevant
to the issuance or validity of a patent, became subject to this “atomic
15
bomb” remedy against fraud. In Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., for
example, the Federal Circuit affirmed a ruling of inequitable conduct
where the patentee had made several small entity maintenance fee
payments to the Patent Office after the patents in suit had issued,
when in fact the patentee was not entitled to claim small entity status
16
under the relevant regulation.
In another example, the Federal
Circuit held that inequitable conduct had occurred where an
applicant falsely stated to the Patent Office, in order to expedite
examination, that his search of the prior art was “careful and
17
thorough.” These cases hardly involve the gross misconduct and
deceit that characterized the original Supreme Court cases.
The expansion of this doctrine, characteristic of many appellate
issues, evolved into a multi-part test for compliance. Thus, the
evolving doctrine took on the character of a two-part test, which
requires a patent challenger to show materiality and intent to deceive
18
the Patent Office by clear and convincing evidence. Far from the
Supreme Court’s admonitions about a flexible approach to redress
genuine fraud and deceit, this test constrains a court’s flexibility and
invites it to lose sight of the central principle of inequitable
conduct—namely, that a court “will not extend its aid to a
19
wrongdoer.”
As a simple mathematical matter, as a court considers seriatim each
element of materiality and intent “and determin[es] in what manner
it has been affected by the broadening of the concept of ‘fraud’
20
before the Patent Office,” the court effectively doubles the number
of cases that might otherwise fall into an overall “unclean hands” test.
Moreover, the test for materiality is much broader than necessary to
prevent avoidance of prior art that might indeed affect the outcome
of the patent prosecution. Indeed, the Patent Office has adopted
15. 504 F.3d 1223, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
16. Id. at 1230–33, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–19.
17. See Gen. Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1411–12,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1154–55 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
18. Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1326,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
19. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 260, 61 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 241, 251 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
429 U.S. 17 (1976).
20. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794, 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 532, 544 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
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rules that limit the scope of material prior art. Yet the Federal Circuit
retains a test for materiality that calls into question almost any
undisclosed prior art, not just prior art of consequence to the
issuance decision. As stated in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v.
21
Bridge Medical, Inc., “the test for materiality is whether a reasonable
examiner would have considered the information important, not
whether the information would conclusively decide the issue of
22
patentability.”
In McKesson, an applicant’s failure to notify the
examiner of the allowance of claims in a co-pending application was
material merely because those claims gave rise to a “conceivable”
23
double patenting rejection. District courts relying on McKesson have
recognized that the “reasonable examiner” standard is less stringent
than the Patent Office’s own definition of materiality and have relied
24
on the testimony of patent examiners to evaluate materiality.
This materiality test also becomes important because some modern
iterations of the doctrine often allow a high showing of materiality to
25
“trump” a low showing of intent to deceive, and vice versa.
This gradual evolution away from the roots of the inequitable
conduct doctrine inspired litigants to use inequitable conduct as a
strategic part of a defense against patent infringement. An allegation
of inequitable conduct opened the door to vast discovery into the
circumstances of the patent prosecution, leveled an embarrassing
charge of fraud as a counterweight to the presumption of patent
validity, and even disqualified the prosecuting attorney (who may be
a witness) from the patentee’s litigation team.
With these
considerations, inequitable conduct became a standard pleading
practice in patent cases. The Federal Circuit, even early in its history,
26
recognized this misuse of the fraud doctrine as a “plague.”
21. 487 F.3d 897, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
22. Id. at 925, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885 (citing Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship
v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
23. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
24. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 07-cv-3770, 2009 WL 5159650,
at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2009) (collecting cases that allowed testimony from former
patent examiners on the question of materiality); Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp.,
514 F. Supp. 2d 511, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 1112, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1417 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] reasonable examiner would . . . consider that prior art
important in deciding patentability. However, the materiality of this reference is low.
It is not material when measured against the more stringent standards of the
USPTO’s Rule 56 . . . .”). Of course, I express no view here on whether these cases
were rightly decided under Federal Circuit law.
25. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
26. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Burlington Indus.,
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At that point, the Federal Circuit intervened to attempt to cabin
the doctrine and return it to its roots. The result was Kingsdown
27
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., where the Federal Circuit,
sitting en banc, held that mistakenly including a previously rejected
28
claim into a later application was not inequitable conduct. As I have
said before, the court in Kingsdown clearly conveyed that “inequitable
conduct was not a remedy for every mistake, blunder, or fault in the
29
patent procurement process.”
Yet sadly, Kingsdown may have
retracted the margins of the doctrine only temporarily, as many of
the more recent cases have shown that it did not achieve its
30
objective.
As the margins of inequitable conduct fluctuated back and forth,
the Federal Circuit has attempted again more recently to restore
some certainty to the doctrine. It has reminded district courts and
litigants that a finding of inequitable conduct has severe
31
consequences. District courts appear to be taking these warnings to
32
heart. And even where those reminders fail, the court has given
patentees a way to short-circuit claims of inequitable conduct by
requiring accused infringers to identify the specifics of the material
Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
27. 863 F.2d 867, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
28. Id. at 873, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
29. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350,
87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2053 (2009).
30. Id., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123; see Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d
1181, 1194, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Novo Nordisk
Pharms., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1362–63, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1811, 1822–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
31. See Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317,
1340–41, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1272–73 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Star Scientific, Inc. v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365,
1376, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
32. See Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 641 F. Supp. 2d 353, 359 (D. Del.
2009) (“[A]lthough neither Dr. Fischell nor Mr. Rosenberg prosecuted the ‘312
application with the professional care and vigor one might expect from them,
I believe it would be clear error for me to imbue their conduct with deceptive intent
on this record.”); Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d
329, 379–80 (D. Del. 2009) (“In short, Par’s proof is incriminating, but not
incriminating enough.”); Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., No. 07-80435-CIV, 2009 WL
3855174, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009) (“Considering the specific facts of this case,
the equity is better served by denying Defendant’s likelihood of success in
inequitable conduct defense . . . .”). But see Ring Plus, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC,
637 F. Supp. 2d 423, 440 n.6 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (“At a minimum, Defendants have
shown by clear and convincing evidence that the applicants made material
misstatements coupled with a ‘reckless indifference to the truth’ and an ‘absence of
evidence of good faith.’” (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882
F.2d 1556, 1562, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1750, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 1989))). Once again,
I express no view here on whether these cases were rightly decided.
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misrepresentation or omission in their pleadings and to sufficiently
allege facts that would allow a court to reasonably infer knowledge
33
and intent. The last part of the Federal Circuit’s current test—
requiring the court to determine whether the materiality and intent
to deceive, once found, amount to inequitable conduct—is very
34
important. Still, once a court has found both materiality and intent,
it is a short, slippery step into the final ruling of unenforceability.
This brief recounting of some of the fluctuation of the inequitable
conduct doctrine serves to illustrate the difficulties of an appellate
process that works always at the margins of the law. Perhaps the
antidote, as I have reminded my colleagues (and myself) from time to
35
time, is to remember the founding principles of each doctrine.
In sum, the Federal Circuit has vacillated on inequitable conduct
in an attempt to fashion delicate rules that waver to account for the
context and posture of the particular marginal facts at issue. Rather
than collapse under the pressure of particularized fact patterns by
creating rules and exceptions to those rules, the Federal Circuit’s
inequitable conduct jurisprudence might profit from a renewed focus
on propounding clear standards that can be easily applied by lower
courts and the public. One way to do this would be to issue more
precedential opinions in cases that are seemingly straightforward.
In other words, our courts should occasionally take advantage of
clear-cut cases to restate and reinforce the fundamental
36
underpinnings of this doctrine.
To be clear, the common law appellate system draws great benefits
as well from deciding cases at the margins of the law. Those cases
permit the courts to brighten fuzzy lines and distinguish various
aspects of a particular legal issue by embracing new thoughts,
technologies, and needs. But those benefits carry the vast risk of
unintended consequences. As noted, litigants continually solicit
courts to rewrite or modify the law to suit their particular needs.
33. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1328–29,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656, 1668–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
34. Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc., 559 F.3d at 1326, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
35. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350,
87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1110, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“In light of
the rejuvenation of the inequitable conduct tactic, this court ought to revisit
occasionally its Kingsdown opinion.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2053 (2009).
36. Most such cases are now disposed of summarily or through non-precedential
opinions. For the time frames September 30, 2007 to September 30, 2008 and
September 30, 2008 to September 30, 2009, 66.3% and 64.9% of cases appealed to
the Federal Circuit were disposed of in a non-precedential manner, respectively.
See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Chart of Caseload Analysis for FY
2008–FY 2009, at 2, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/Caseload
AnalysisFY09.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
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Courts, in turn, sometimes oblige without adequate attention to the
full consequences of expanding the law’s central principles and
concepts. This recurring theme can lead to exception piled on
exception until the law has become far less legal. With inequitable
conduct as a doctrine of warning, appellate courts ought to reason
from the anchoring security of common and fundamental principles.
Otherwise, the law risks a battering ride on the constantly changing
tides of marginal litigation.

